Text Of The Prespa Agreement


Among the various eyebrow-raising provisions of the final agreement concluded between Greece and North Macedonia of 17 June 2018 (`the Prespa Agreement`) [1], which delimit, for example, the ethnohistorical roots of the citizens of northern Macedonia (Article 7 of the Agreement) or which closely limit the many stages of the conclusion of the Agreement (Article 1, paragraph 4), lay down provisions on the erga omnes use of the new name north Macedonia This is a series of interesting questions which concern the following issues: o the impact of the Treaties on third countries. While references to Erga omnes jargon are extremely rare in international treaties, especially in bilateral treaties, the use erga omnes of the name agreed by the parties to the dispute constituted an invariation of Greece`s political position during the lengthy negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. [2] The result seems to be lagging behind Greek aspirations: Article 1(3)(a) provides that the Contracting Parties shall use the official name `Republic of North Macedonia` erga omnes or, as stated in Article 1(8), `for all uses and purposes erga omnes`. Article 1(5) goes on to emphasise that erga omnes means that the withdrawal of the Greek veto led the European Union to authorise, on 27 June, the start of accession negotiations with the Republic of Macedonia, which were due to start next year subject to the implementation of the Prespa Agreement and the change of the country`s constitutional name in North Macedonia. [62] On July 5, the Macedonian Parliament recongaled the Prespa Agreement, with 69 votes in favor. [63] On July 11, NATO invited Macedonia to start accession negotiations for the 30th becoming a member of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. [64] National communities reacted more negatively to the agreement. In Macedonia, the President of the Republic, Gjorge Ivanov, said he would not sign the agreement, calling it “catastrophic”. [23] In addition, VMRO-DPMNE, a right-wing party, also rejected the deal and promised to hold public protests against it. [24] In Macedonia, protests were violent in Skopje and Macedonian SDSM MP Hari Lokvenec, present at the Prespa ceremony, set fire to his parliamentary vehicle in Bitola by unknown perpetrators. [25] After leaving the post of Greek foreign minister, Kotzias said in October 2018 that the Prespa agreement was on track to improve stability in the Balkans and end Turkish influence in the region.

[26] [27] On 25 June, the Greek Foreign Ministry informed the EU and NATO that Greece no longer opposed Macedonia`s Euro-Atlantic membership under its new name. However, the next day, Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov refused to sign the agreement[58] and threatened Macedonian Prime Minister Zaev and the deputies of the government coalition with a prison sentence of at least 5 years for voting in favor of an agreement that, according to Ivanov, would impute the Republic of Macedonia to a foreign state. “I do not accept the amendment of the Constitution which aims to change the constitutional name [of the country]. I do not accept any idea or proposal that would jeopardize the national identity of Macedonia, the individuality of the Macedonian nation, the Macedonian language and the Macedonian model of coexistence. In the presidential elections, 534,910 citizens voted in favour of this electoral programme. The agreement goes beyond the scope of UN Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993) as it relates to `difference in the name of the state` and not to the `disputes` covered by the agreement,” Ivanov said, adding that “this agreement makes the Republic of Macedonia dependent on another country, namely the Hellenic Republic. . . .